Juliette Rouchier and Sophie Thoyer (2006)
Votes and Lobbying in the European Decision-Making Process: Application to the European Regulation on GMO Release
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
vol. 9, no. 3
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Received: 03-Aug-2004 Accepted: 29-May-2006 Published: 30-Jun-2006
Note that for Pm= 0, equations (2) and (3) and equations (2') and (3') are the same and equivalent to the simpler Tullock's model described in equation (1). The median voter, in such case, does not influence the decision.
|Figure 1. Lobbying interactions at domestic and European level (round t)|
|Sens-NGO + Sens-Firm = 1|
This sensitivity parameters are equivalent to γE and γF of section 2.
|Change in Public-Opinion = ( Firm-Lobbying * Sens-Firm) - ( NGO-Lobbying × Sens-NGO)||(5)|
|Influence = (Firm Lobbying × Sens-Firm) - (NGO Lobbying × Sens-NGO)||(6)|
If influence > 0 then Val-Vote = max (Public Opinion - 0.5; 1)
If influence < 0 then Val-Vote = min (Public Opinion + 0.5; 5)
Then the Decision-Maker votes at the European level:
If Val-Vote > 3, then he votes in favour of the GM-product (YES)
If Val-Vote ≤ 3, then he votes against the GM-product (NO).
|Table 1: Frequency of observed patterns|
|Permanent authorization||4 cases||5 cases|
|Cyclical authorization||No cases||37 cases|
|No authorization with majority satisfied|
(average Public-Opinion < 3)
|83 cases||39 cases|
|No authorization with minority satisfied|
(average Public-Opinion > 3)
|33 cases||39 cases|
Note: Numbers calculated out of 120 different simulations: 6 lobbing capacities, 5 initial value of Public-Opinions, 4 combinations of Lobbying strategies.
|Table 2: Correlation coefficients between initial opinion and average final opinion|
Note: Result of 50 random choice of initial sensitivity and opinion. For each set of initial parameters, 10 simulations are run and calculations are made on the average value.
|Table 3: Correlation coefficients between weighted average sensitivity to firm lobbying and average final opinion|
Note: simulations are the same as in table 2.
|Figure 2. Number of satisfied countries in the 1990 and 2001 Directives for different levels of weighted average sensitivity to firm's lobbying|
|Figure 3. Number of satisfied countries in the 1990 and 2001 Directives for different levels of weighted average initial public opinion|
|Table 4: The efficiency of NGO lobbying strategies under the 1990 and the 2001 procedures - when the Firm's lobbying strategy is Pro|
|NGO lobbying strategy|
|1990 and 2001: |
|1990 and 2001:|
|Differences in final average public opinion (vote90 - vote2001) (1)||0.45**||0.21*||0.75**||-0.09|
|Differences in standard deviation of final public opinion |
(vote90 - Vote2001) (2)
2 The median voter is the voter whose preference is such that there are as many voters whose preferences are lower as voters whose preferences are higher.
3 In this paper, the international level is the European level.
4 This paper was written before the EU enlargement: the European model is therefore based on 15 country members, each having a fixed voting weight (see appendix 1).
5 One can note that there are two mains procedures for voting at the European Council: qualified majority voting or the veto system (ie, unanimity). The qualified majority requires a minimum of 62 votes out of 83 votes in total.
6 The dispute was triggered by the approval in 1996 by the EU of a variety of Bt-corn produced by Novartis and of the Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybean (1996), for which scientists had expressed serious doubts concerning their health and environment immunity. In June 1999, Denmark, France, Greece Italy and Luxembourg issued a declaration that they would effectively block new GMO approvals until the European Commission proposed legislation for traceability and labeling of GMOs and products derived therefrom.
7 In 2004, after all regulations on product signaling have been organized, the moratorium was eventually lifted
8 The first-time consent for a release of GMOs is limited to a maximum of ten years.
9 Here, we depart from the theoretical presentation where opinion value ranged from -1 to +1
10 Sensitivities to lobbying are drawn randomly
11 for example a country with a Public-Opinion value inferior to 3 (therefore against GMO), and a European decision in favour of authorization; or vice versa, a country with a Public-Opinion value superior to 3 (therefore in favour of GMO), and a European decision rejecting the notification.
12 Weighted average sensitivity is the sensitivity coefficients ( sens-NGO and sens-Firm) averaged across the 15 European countries, weighted by their voting power.
13 It is not interesting to run simulations for estimated values of Public Opinions in the 15 European countries since we have shown that the simulation results are independent of initial opinions after a few runs.
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|Table A1: Vote weights and Sens-Firm. Analogy with "real-world" situation — figures given by the authors after literature review and expert interviews|
|Country||Voting weight||Firm sensitivity|
|Figure A1. The Vote90 procedure in the multi-agent model|
|Figure A2. The Vote2001 procedure in the multi-agent model|
Dotted lines indicate the main differences between Vote90 and Vote2001
|Table A2: Frequency of decision patterns for different levels of lobbying capacity- Vote 90|
|Lobbying capacity (number of campaigns)||5||10||15||20||25||30|
|No authorization with majority satisfied||60%||60%||40%||35%||0%||0%|
|No authorization with minority satisfied||20%||30%||30%||15%||50%||100%|
|Table A3: Frequency of decision patterns for different levels of lobbying capacity — Vote 2001|
|Number of Campaigns||5||10||15||20||25||30|
|No authorization with majority satisfied||80%||80%||80%||95%||70%||0%|
|No authorization with minority satisfied||0%||10%||10%||5%||30%||100%|
|Table A4: Frequency of decision patterns for different levels of initial Public-Opinions- Vote90|
|No authorization with majority satisfied||59%||59%||29%||12.5%||4%|
|No authorization with minority satisfied||8%||8%||25%||37.5%||42%|
|Table A5: Frequency of decision patterns for different levels of initial Public-Opinions — Vote2001|
|No authorization with majority satisfied||83%||79%||79%||54%||50%|
|No authorization with minority satisfied||17%||21%||21%||38%||42%|
|Table A6: Frequency of decision patterns for different lobbying strategies — Vote90|
|Lobbying (Firm - NGO)||Anti-anti||Anti-pro||Pro-anti||Pro-pro|
|No authorization with majority satisfied||20%||23%||33%||37%|
|No authorization with minority satisfied||0%||77%||43%||46%|
|Table A7: Frequency of decision patterns for different lobbying strategies — Vote2001|
|Lobbying (Firm - NGO)||Anti-anti||Anti-pro||Pro-anti||Pro-pro|
|No authorization with majority satisfied||70%||83%||43%||73%|
|No authorization with minority satisfied||23%||17%||40%||27%|
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