Yutaka Nakai and Masayoshi Muto (2008)
Emergence and Collapse of Peace with Friend Selection Strategies
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
vol. 11, no. 3 6
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Received: 15-Oct-2007 Accepted: 27-May-2008 Published: 30-Jun-2008
|Figure 1 (left) Performer's and Performed's Payoffs. Figure 2 (right) Battle Game's Payoff Matrix.|
|Figure 3. Concept of us-TFT Strategy|
|Table 1. Friend Selection Strategies (FSSs)|
|Figure 4. Evolutionary Simulation of Peace|
|Figure 5. Process of Perception Phase|
|Figure 6. Us-TFT Agent's Perception: "Friend" or "Enemy"?|
Figure 7. Friend Ratio vs. Turns (Upper: MFSSs, Lower: MFSSs and OFSSs)|
*Number of Agents: N=20 agents, Matching Number of Agent in One Battle Game: M=19 agents, Reflection Ratio: R=10, Perception Error Rate: μp=5%, Strategy's Mutation Rate: μs=0.3%
|Figure 8. Observation of Relationships among Agents|
|Figure 9. Typical Changes in Friendships|
|Figure 10. Expansion of us-TFT In-group due to Perception Error|
|Figure 11. Prevailing Strategy vs. Turns (Round Robin Battle Game)|
|Figure 12. Strict me-TFT Agent vs. Generous us-TFT Agent|
|Figure 13. Changes in State of an ALL_D Agent|
|Figure 14. Changes in State of an us-CWD Agent|
|Figure 15. Typical Transitions between Prevailing Strategies (Round Robin Battle Game)|
|Table 2. The selected results of the simulations (Round Robin Game)|
Figure 16. Prevailing Strategy vs. Turns (Random Matching Battle Game)|
* Number of Agents: N=20 agents, Matching Number of Agent in One Battle Game: M=4 agents, Reflection Ratio: R=10%, Perception Error Rate: μp=5%, Strategy's Mutation Rate: μs=0.3%
|Figure 17. Typical Transitions between Prevailing Strategies (Random Matching Battle Game)|
|Table 3. The selected results of the simulations (Random Matching Game)|
|Figure 18. Emergence of Community|
2 In indirect reciprocity studies, the social perception that all others are friends is newly assigned to all agents at the beginning of every turn. And all agents' perceptions continue to be updated during the turn.
3 By introducing an error rate, indirect reciprocity studies assume a few agents who have different social perceptions from others. However, this can be seen as simply a perturbation because it doesn't change the basic logic that the same initial perceptions and experiences lead to the same perceptions. Moreover, even if the number of agents with different perceptions increases, all perceptions are abandoned and newly assigned at the beginning of each turn.
4 In this study, the social perception that all others are enemies is assigned to all agents in the 0th turn. Additionally, all agents' perceptions are not updated during one turn but continue to be updated throughout the turns. That is, an initial perception in our study doesn't mean a perception at the beginning of a turn, but one in the 0th turn.
5 If a lonely us-TFT agent happens to regard only one member of the in-group as a "friend" due to a misunderstanding, nothing happens. From his viewpoint, the in-group members are hostile to himself but peaceful to his "friends". Following PF12 in the us-TFT definition, each member's total score equals to zero ( -1.0+1.0 = 0), and so members remain as "enemies" for the lonely us-TFT agent. If we change PF11 and PF12 into a new rule that requires an agent to change his perception of another agent from an "enemy" to a "friend" if the total score of the other agent is positive or zero, the consequences change. In the case, members change from "enemies" to "friends" for the lonely us-TFT agent. That is, having one new "friend" due to a misunderstanding causes the lonely us-TFT agent to change into a member of an us-TFT in-group. Note that original PF11 and PF12 are regarded as neutral rules. A violation of the neutrality, the modification of PF11 and PF12 leads to more frequent emergences of a peaceful state.
6 The scenarios show that the us (me)-CWD destroys social order. In order to prevent it, it is necessary to identify us (me)-CWD agents. Previous studies pointed out that cheaters can be identified by a strategy using a signal, which is called "costly signal strategy" (Smith and Bliege Bird 2000; Bliege Bird, Smith and Bird 2001; Bliege Bird and Smith 2005) or "handicap theory" (Zahavi 1975; Zahavi 1977; Boone 1998). According them, a honest agent sends others a peculiar signal though it imposes a cost to him, while a cheater cannot. That is, a strategy based on a signal may evolve together with one based on others' actions (us-TFT), and then the signal-based strategy may exclude us (me)-CWD agents.
7 The findings of this study should be verified empirically. It is desirable to verify them quantitatively. (As a good example, Cederman (2003) quantitatively verified the power-law in international conflicts.) However, in general, models following the KISS principle don't aim at a precise prediction of social phenomena. Therefore, a quantitative comparison between simulation results and empirical facts is probably impossible, although it is an ideal approach. A more realistic approach would be to identify the similarities between simulation results and real phenomena, such as historical phenomena.
8 In previous studies, DISC agents hold a common perception (good or bad) and take a common actions (help or don't help) against the other. That is, there seem to be something like a norm. However, this norm doesn't emerge but comes directly from their assumptions of the common initial perception and the common information about others' actions.
9 Most related studies pay attentions to reputation and communication of reputations as a mechanism for sharing information (Janssen 2006; Conte and Paolucci 2002; Sabater and Sierra 2002; Sabater et al. 2006; Sabater 2003; Hahn et al. 2007; Ashri et al. 2005; Schlosser et al. 2006; Younger 2004; Castelfranchi et al. 1998; Hales 2002). In these studies, agents update their own reputations about the other by exchanging reputations among them. In contrast, our study does not assume the communication (exchange) of reputations about the other. Furthermore, in reputation theories related to e-commerce, a lie and credibility have been deeply considered (Younger 2004; Castelfranchi et al. 1998; Hales 2002).
10 Hales (2002) and Axelrod & Hammond (2003) showed the emergence of a group using a tag model.
11 Most non-economic studies pay attentions to social classes. They assume that agent's actions depend on whether agents are strong or weak (Younger 2004; Castelfranchi et al. 1998; Hales 2002). Furthermore, many studies on e-commerce have introduced roles such as a seller and a buyer, for example (Janssen 2006; Conte and Paolucci 2002; Sabater and Sierra 2002; Sabater et al. 2006; Sabater 2003; Hahn et al. 2007; Ashri et al. 2005; Schlosser et al. 2006).
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