Scott Moss (2001)
Game Theory: Limitations and an Alternative
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
vol. 4, no. 2,
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/4/2/2.html>
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Received: 01Nov00 Accepted: 01Feb01 Published: 31Mar01
Figure 1. Power law distributions in retail trades in the United Kingdom. Source: Nielsen 1992. 


Table 1: Cumulative market share of largest x% of shops  


% of shops  all grocers  mult. Grocers  pharmacies  cnt 
2  54  12  5  7 
5  75  25  11  14 
10  85  42  19  24 
15  89  55  26  31 
20  90  65  33  38 
25  92  72  39  44 
30  93  78  45  50 
35  94  83  50  56 
40  95  86  56  61 
45  96  88  65  66 
50  97  91  69  70 
55  97  92  74  74 
60  98  94  78  78 
65  98  95  81  82 
70  98  96  85  85 
75  99  97  88  89 
80  99  98  92  92 
85  99  99  95  95 
90  100  99  98  97 
95  100  100  100  99 
100  100  100  100  100 

Figure 2. The cognitive agents' problem space architecture. 
(a) 50x50 grid (2500 cells) 
(b) 30x30 grid (900 cells) 
(c) 25x25 grid (625 cells) 
Figure 3 . Agent densities and sales volumes in relation to demands 
Figure 4. Intermediaries' sales volumes in a 25x25 (625 cell) grid 
Figure 5. Intermediaries' sales obey the power law at trading cycle 49 


Table 2: Regression estimates of power law log y = log a + b log x  


trading cycle  a  b  R square 
19   0.73751  1.555198  0.953736 
29   0.44535  1.477288  0.988578 
39   0.90515  2.042664  0.942295 
49  0.04263  1.204543  0.983854 

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