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Agent Models, Network Simulations, Health Informatics, Bayesian Models
Alistair Sutcliffe and Di Wang
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 15 (2) 1
Kyeywords: Agent Models, Network Simulations, Health Informatics, Bayesian Models
Abstract: The process by which genes and memes influence behaviour is poorly understood. Genes generally may have a strong influence as predispositions directing individuals towards certain behaviours; whereas memes may have a less direct influence as information inputs to cognitive processes determining behaviour. In certain areas of medical science, knowledge has progressed towards approximate quantification of genetic influences, while social psychology can provide models of mimetic influence as the spread of attitudes. This paper describes a computational model integration of genetic and mimetic influences in a healthcare domain. It models mimetic influences of advertising and health awareness messages in populations with genetic predispositions towards obesity; environmental variables influence both gene expression and mimetic force. Sensitivity analysis using the model with different population network structures is used to investigate the relative force of meme spread and influence.
Mason Wright and Pratim Sengupta
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 18 (2) 3
Kyeywords: Multi-Agent Models, Lobbying, Public Choice, Bounded Rationality, Voting Behavior, Social Simulation
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the interactions among oligarchs, political parties, and voters using an agent-based modeling approach. We introduce the OLIGO model, which is based on the spatial model of democracy, where voters have positions in a policy space and vote for the party that appears closest to them, and parties move in policy space to seek more votes. We extend the existing literature on agent-based models of political economy in the following manner: (1) by introducing a new class of agents – oligarchs – that represent leaders of firms in a common industry who lobby for beneficial subsidies through campaign donations; and (2) by investigating the effects of ideological preferences of the oligarchs on legislative action. We test hypotheses from the literature in political economics on the behavior of oligarchs and political parties as they interact, under conditions of imperfect information and bounded rationality. Our key results indicate that (1) oligarchs tend to donate less to political campaigns when the parties are more resistant to changing their policies, or when voters are more in-formed; and (2) if Oligarchs donate to parties based on a combination of ideological and profit motivations, Oligarchs will tend to donate at a lower equilibrium level, due to the influence of lost profits. We validate these outcomes via comparisons to real world polling data on changes in party support over time.