Citing this article

A standard form of citation of this article is:

Joyce, David, Kennison, John, Densmore, Owen, Guerin, Stephen, Barr, Shawn, Charles, Eric and Thompson, Nicholas S. (2006). 'My Way or the Highway: a More Naturalistic Model of Altruism Tested in an Iterative Prisoners' Dilemma'. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9(2)4 <http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/2/4.html>.

The following can be copied and pasted into a Bibtex bibliography file, for use with the LaTeX text processor:

@article{joyce2006,
title = {My Way or the Highway: a More Naturalistic Model of Altruism Tested in an Iterative Prisoners' Dilemma},
author = {Joyce, David and Kennison, John and Densmore, Owen and Guerin, Stephen and Barr, Shawn and Charles, Eric and Thompson, Nicholas S.},
journal = {Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation},
ISSN = {1460-7425},
volume = {9},
number = {2},
pages = {4},
year = {2006},
URL = {http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/2/4.html},
keywords = {Game Theory; Altruism; Prisoners' Dilemma; TIT FOR TAT; MOTH; Docking; Netlogo},
abstract = {There are three prominent solutions to the Darwinian problem of altruism, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and trait group selection. Only one, reciprocal altruism, most commonly implemented in game theory as a TIT FOR TAT strategy, is not based on the principle of conditional association. On the contrary, TIT FOR TAT implements conditional altruism in the context of unconditionally determined associates. Simulations based on Axelrod's famous tournament have led many to conclude that conditional altruism among unconditional partners lies at the core of much human and animal social behavior. But the results that have been used to support this conclusion are largely artifacts of the structure of the Axelrod tournament, which explicitly disallowed conditional association as a strategy. In this study, we modify the rules of the tournament to permit competition between conditional associates and conditional altruists. We provide evidence that when unconditional altruism is paired with conditional association, a strategy we called MOTH, it can out compete TIT FOR TAT under a wide range of conditions.},
}

The following can be copied and pasted into a text file, which can then be imported into a reference database that supports imports using the RIS format, such as Reference Manager and EndNote.


TY - JOUR
TI - My Way or the Highway: a More Naturalistic Model of Altruism Tested in an Iterative Prisoners' Dilemma
AU - Joyce, David
AU - Kennison, John
AU - Densmore, Owen
AU - Guerin, Stephen
AU - Barr, Shawn
AU - Charles, Eric
AU - Thompson, Nicholas S.
Y1 - 2006/03/31
JO - Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
SN - 1460-7425
VL - 9
IS - 2
SP - 4
UR - http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/9/2/4.html
KW - Game Theory; Altruism; Prisoners' Dilemma; TIT FOR TAT; MOTH; Docking; Netlogo
N2 - There are three prominent solutions to the Darwinian problem of altruism, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and trait group selection. Only one, reciprocal altruism, most commonly implemented in game theory as a TIT FOR TAT strategy, is not based on the principle of conditional association. On the contrary, TIT FOR TAT implements conditional altruism in the context of unconditionally determined associates. Simulations based on Axelrod's famous tournament have led many to conclude that conditional altruism among unconditional partners lies at the core of much human and animal social behavior. But the results that have been used to support this conclusion are largely artifacts of the structure of the Axelrod tournament, which explicitly disallowed conditional association as a strategy. In this study, we modify the rules of the tournament to permit competition between conditional associates and conditional altruists. We provide evidence that when unconditional altruism is paired with conditional association, a strategy we called MOTH, it can out compete TIT FOR TAT under a wide range of conditions.
ER -